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I.	  Introduction	  
For	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  (GEG),	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  crisis	  in	  2007–
2008	   triggered	  deep	   cognitive	   dissonance.	   	  On	   the	   heels	   of	   beleaguered	   international	   trade	   talks,	  
devastating	  volatility	  in	  global	  commodity	  prices,	  and	  growing	  disenchantment	  with	  Western	  models	  
of	  development	  and	  aid,	  the	  financial	  shocks	  that	  reverberated	  from	  Wall	  Street	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  
world	   called	   into	   question	   many	   of	   the	   conventional	   wisdoms	   regarding	   how	   and	   by	   whom	   the	  
world	   economy	   should	   be	   run.	   	   Such	   dissent	   is	   hardly	   new,	   as	   evident	   in	   the	   growth	   of	   protest	  
movements	  surrounding	  the	  global	  governance	  of	  trade,	  finance	  and	  development	  over	  the	  previous	  
two	  decades	  (O’Brien	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Broad	  2002;	  Stiglitz	  2002;	  Wilkinson	  2002;	  Scholte	  2011).	  	  Yet,	  the	  
financial	  meltdown	   of	   the	  world’s	   leading	   economy	   significantly	   sharpened	   public	   awareness	   and	  
attention	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  reform.	  
In	   short,	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   incited	   serious	   reflection	   on	   the	   legitimacy,	   relevance	   and	  
effectiveness	  of	  the	  core	  ideas,	  rules	  and	  structures	  that	  have	  governed	  the	  world	  economy	  over	  the	  
past	  several	  decades.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  has	  sparked	  numerous	  efforts	  to	  rethink	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  reform	  
the	  formal	  and	   informal	   institutions	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  to	  redress	   failures	  of	  the	  past.	  	  
Yet	  such	  revolutions,	  even	  at	  moments	  of	  clear	   ‘punctuated	  equilibrium’,	  do	  not	  happen	  overnight	  
(Helleiner	  2010;	  Moschella	  and	  Tsingou	  2012).	  	  Complex	  crises,	  surrounded	  by	  pervasive	  uncertainty	  
and	  risk	  and	  riddled	  with	  vested	  interests	  and	  collective	  action	  problems,	  can	  reinforce	  continuity	  as	  
well	  as	  spur	  change.	   	  Our	   task	  as	  scholars	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	   is	   to	  make	  sense	  of	   this	  
chaos:	  to	  unpack	  and	  explain	  the	  dynamics	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  to	  understand	  where	  we	  
have	  been,	  where	  we	  are	  today,	  and	  where	  we	  may	  be	  going.	  	  
To	   that	   end,	   there	   are	   at	   least	   three	   trends	   we	   observe	   in	   contemporary	   global	   economic	  
governance	  that	  provoke	  an	  initial	  set	  of	  questions	  on	  the	  state	  of	  contemporary	  global	  governance.	  	  
First,	   there	   is	  a	  clear	  proliferation	  of	   institutions	  across	   the	  world.	   	  This	  appears	  most	  prevalent	   in	  
global	  trade	  with	  an	  astonishing	  boom	  in	  preferential	  trade	  agreements	  and	  regional	  organizations	  
(Baldwin	  2011;	  Freund	  and	  Ornelas	  2010;	  Ravenhill	  2011;	  WTO	  2011).	   	   It	   is	  also	  apparent	   in	  global	  
finance,	  such	  as	  multilaterization	  of	  the	  Chiang-­‐Mai	  Initiative	  (Grimes	  2009;	  Henning	  2009;	  Lombardi	  
2010)	   and	   growing	   influence	   of	   international	   standard-­‐setting	   bodies	   (Büthe	   and	   Mattli	   2011;	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Griffith-­‐Jones	   et	   al.	   2010).	   	   In	   international	   development,	  we	  have	   seen	   an	   increased	  presence	   of	  
new	  bilateral	  aid	  donors	  outside	  of	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  as	  
well	   as	   influential	   private	   foundations	   such	   as	   the	   Bill	   and	  Melinda	   Gates	   Foundation	   (Kapur	   and	  
Whittle	  2010;	  Büthe	  et	  al.	  2012).	   	  Why	  and	  how	   is	   this	   institutional	   landscape	  changing?	   	  How	  did	  
the	   ex	   ante	   rules,	   norms	   and	   structures	   of	   global	   economic	   governance	   inhibit	   or	   compel	   this	  
growth?	   	  Alternatively,	   how	  has	   the	   increase	   in	   the	  number,	   geographical	   diversity	   and	   variety	   of	  
institutions	  affected	  how	  global	  trade,	  finance	  and	  development	  are	  governed	  today?	  	  How	  are	  new	  
institutions	  challenging	  the	  relevance,	  legitimacy	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  preexisting	  institutions?	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  is	  also	  growth	  within	  extant	  institutions	  with	  respect	  to	  membership	  and	  
tasks	   that	  merit	  closer	   inquiry.	   	  For	  example,	   there	  are	  an	   increasing	  number	  of	  member	  states	   in	  
traditional	   IGOs,	   such	  as	   the	  WTO,	   IMF	  and	  World	  Bank,	   regional	  organizations	   (like	   the	  European	  
Union)	   and	   other	   global	   forums	   (such	   as	   the	   G20).	   	   In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   crisis,	   even	   a	   number	   of	  
regulatory	  bodies,	  which	  have	  traditionally	  operated	  as	  exclusive	  clubs	  for	  the	  advanced	  economies,	  
have	   expanded	   their	  membership	   (i.e.,	   the	   Financial	   Stability	   Board	   and	   the	   Basel	   Committee	   for	  
Banking	  Supervision).	   	  Membership	  expansion	  has	  often	  been	  accompanied	  by	  task	  expansion	  that	  
has	   taken	  place	  via	  either	  explicit	  principals’	  delegation	  of	  powers	   (as	   is	   the	  case	  with	   the	  FSB)	  or	  
informal	   appropriation	   of	   new	   functions	   (as	   is	   the	   case	  with	   the	   IMF’s	   involvement	  with	   financial	  
sector	   surveillance)	   (Moschella	   2011).	   	   These	   developments	   raise	   important	   questions.	   	   To	   what	  
extent	  is	  membership	  expansion	  a	  reflection	  of	  broader	  shifts	  in	  material	  or	  ideational	  power	  in	  the	  
world	  that	  necessitate	  the	  inclusion	  of	  new	  actors	  and	  emerging	  powers,	  particularly	  the	  BRICS,	  into	  
the	   fold	   (Alexandroff	   and	   Cooper	   2010;	   Florini	   2011;	  Grabel	   2012)?	   	   Is	   the	  mission	   expansion	   the	  
natural	   outcome	   of	   structural	   changes	   in	   the	   global	   economy	   or	   does	   it	   reflect	   new	   power	  
configurations	  and	  paradigms?	  I	  n	  turn,	  how	  has	  expansion	  in	  both	  membership	  and	  tasks	  generated	  
stress	   on	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   efficiency	   of	   existing	   decision-­‐making	   rules	   and	   procedures	   and	  
pressures	  for	  institutional	  reform	  (Hurrell	  2006;	  Woods	  2010)?	  
Furthermore,	  we	  also	  observe	  an	  increased	  variety	  in	  who	  holds	  authority	  and	  exercises	  influence	  in	  
global	  economic	  governance.	  	  This	  speaks	  to	  the	  essential	  question	  of	  who	  are	  the	  global	  governors	  
(Avant,	   Finnemore	   and	   Sell	   2010),	   and	   specifically	   the	   need	   to	   account	   for	   the	   presence	   and	  
influence	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	   in	  our	  analyses.	   	   For	  example,	   the	   sustained	  growth	  and	  pressure	  of	  
social	  movement	  protests	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  has	  arguably	  led	  to	  the	  relative	  opening	  (if	  not	  
fully	  inclusive	  attitude)	  of	  many	  economic	  institutions	  towards	  the	  input	  and	  oversight	  of	  civil	  society	  
in	  global	  governance	  (Keck	  and	  Sikkink	  1998;	  O’Brien	  et	  al.	  2000;	  Busby	  2011;	  Scholte	  2011).	  	  Whose	  
interests	  do	  civil	  society	  organizations	  represent?	  	  How	  has	  the	  influence	  of	  civil	  society	  shaped	  the	  
rules	  and	  norms	  of	  contemporary	  global	  governance?	  	  To	  what	  extent	  has	  civil	  society’s	  demand	  for	  
greater	   democratic	   accountability	   changed	   the	   structures	   and	   nature	   of	   decision-­‐making	   and	  
operations	  in	  international	  economic	  institutions?	  
Moreover,	   scholars	   have	   increasingly	   turned	   attention	   to	   the	   growing	   presence	   of	   private	   sector	  
actors	   and	   private	   authority	   in	   global	   governance	   (Cutler,	   Haufler	   and	   Porter	   1999;	   Hall	   and	  
Biersteker	  2002;	  Büthe	  2003;	  Kahler	  and	  Lake	  2003).	  	  They	  have	  sought	  to	  explain	  the	  rise	  of	  private	  
regulation	  (Büthe	  2010;	  Büthe	  and	  Mattli	  2011;	  Germain	  2010;	  Mattli	  and	  Woods	  2009;	  Porter	  and	  
McKeen-­‐Edwards	  forthcoming)	  and	  the	  risks	  of	  regulatory	  capture	  or	  ‘self-­‐regulation’	  by	  the	  private	  
sector	   (Helleiner	   and	   Pagliari	   2010).	   	   Why	   have	   private	   sector	   actors	   gained	   voice	   and	   influence	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(Tsingou	  2012)?	  	  When	  and	  where	  have	  public	  institutions	  delegated	  or	  ceded	  governance	  authority	  
to	   the	   private	   sector,	   and	   why	   (Haufler	   2001;	   Vogel	   2008)?	   	   How	   is	   ‘global	   private	   regulation’	  
challenging	   traditional	   notions	   of	   authority	   and	   power	   in	   global	   governance	   (Büthe	   and	   Mattli	  
2011)?	   	  What	   are	   the	   normative	   and	   logistical	   implications	   of	   this	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   legitimacy	   and	  
effectiveness	  of	  global	  private	  governance	  in	  looking	  out	  for	  the	  public	  interest	  (Zürn	  2004;	  Graz	  and	  
Nolke	  2008;	  Mattli	  and	  Woods	  2009)?	  	  How	  has	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2007–08	  strengthened	  
or	   weakened	   the	   role	   of	   different	   non-­‐state	   actors	   in	   economic	   governance	   (Pagliari	   and	   Young	  
2012)?	  
While	  these	  observations	  and	  questions	  are	  by	  no	  means	  comprehensive	  in	  terms	  of	  capturing	  the	  
complex	  dynamic	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  today,	   they	  do	   lead	  us	   to	   frame	  our	  approach	   in	  
this	   handbook	   around	   the	   three	   Ps	   of	   governance:	  players,	   power	  and	  paradigms.	   	   This	   heuristic	  
allows	   us	   to	   organize	   our	   analysis	   around	   key	   driving	   questions:	  Who	   is	   playing	   a	   central	   role	   in	  
global	  economic	  governance	  of	  the	  defined	  issue	  areas?	  	  What	  are	  the	  sources	  of	  material	  and	  social	  
power	  that	  enable	  these	  ‘global	  governors’	  to	  demand	  or	  assume	  positions	  of	  governing	  authority,	  
define	   agendas,	   and	  write	   and	   enforce	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game?	   	  What	   paradigms	  do	   these	  players	  
bring	   to	   the	   table	   (or	  alternatively,	  how	  do	  dominant	  paradigms	  bring	  certain	  actors	   to	   the	   table),	  
and	  how	  are	  the	  underlying	  principles	  and	  practices	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  shaped	  by	  these	  
ideas	  and	  beliefs	  about	  how	  the	  world	  economy	  does	  and	  should	  work?	  
More	  critically,	  we	  suggest	  a	  dynamic	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  that	  is	  
staked	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   the	   three	   Ps	   are	   part	   of	   an	   unstable	   but	   mutually	   constitutive	  
relationship.	   	   Indeed,	   the	   contributions	   in	   this	   Handbook	   explore	   the	   patterns	   of	   continuity	   and	  
change	   in	  players,	   powers	   and	  paradigms	   showing	  how	   the	   continuity/change	   in	  one	  of	   the	   three	  
dimensions	   is	   closely	   related	   to	   what	   happens	   in	   the	   others.	   	   Highlighting	   the	   interconnections	  
between	  the	  three	  Ps,	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  exploring	  how	  patterns	  of	  continuity/change	  within	  and	  
between	   players,	   powers	   and	   paradigms	   shape	   global	   economic	   governance	   in	   different	   areas	   of	  
activity	  and	  result	  from	  or	  provoke	  the	  kinds	  of	  crises	  of	  legitimacy,	  relevance	  and	  effectiveness	  we	  
observe	   in	   global	   economic	   governance	   today.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   we	   conceive	   the	   relationship	  
between	  power,	   players	   and	  paradigms,	   on	   the	  one	  hand,	   and	   crises	  of	   legitimacy,	   relevance	   and	  
effectiveness,	  on	   the	  other,	   as	  a	   two-­‐way	   street:	   the	   former	   can	  be	   shaped	  by	   the	   latter	  and	  vice	  
versa.	  	  This	  means	  that	  what	  the	  most	  important	  sources	  of	  powers	  are,	  who	  the	  key	  players	  and	  the	  
dominant	   paradigms	   become	   both	   shape	   and	   are	   shaped	   by	   issues	   of	   legitimacy,	   relevance	   and	  
effectiveness.	  
Of	   course,	   we	   acknowledge	   the	   methodological	   difficulties	   that	   derive	   from	   the	   adoption	   of	   this	  
dynamic	  approach.	   	  That	   is	   to	  say,	  we	  realize	   that	   the	  study	  of	   the	  mutual	  constitution	  of	  players,	  
powers	  and	  paradigms	  (as	  well	  as	  the	  mutual	  constitutions	  of	  the	  three	  Ps	  and	  legitimacy,	  relevance	  
and	   effectiveness)	   faces	   scholars	   with	   serious	   problems	   in	   disentangling	   cause-­‐and-­‐effect	  
relationships.	   	   For	   instance,	   if	   much	   of	   IPE	   scholarship	   has	   been	   particularly	   successful	   in	  
conceptualizing	  major	   trends	   in	   global	   economic	   governance	   in	   the	  past	   few	  decades,	   this	   can	  be	  
attributed	  to	  a	  significant	  extent	  to	  the	  epistemological	  choice	  of	  focusing	  on	  one	  specific	  factor	  over	  
the	  others.	   	  However,	   the	  burst	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis—in	   common	  with	  many	  of	   the	   crises	  
that	   preceded	   it—has	   revealed	   how	   limited	   our	   knowledge	   of	   the	   global	   economy	   was	   (Abdelal,	  
Blyth	   and	   Parsons	   2010b).	   	   This	   Handbook	   thus	   takes	   up	   the	   challenge	   of	   making	   sense	   of	   the	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complexity	   of	   the	  world	   economy	  although	   this	  may	  entail	   the	  more	  daunting	   task	  of	   tracing	   and	  
explaining	  mutually	  constitutive	  phenomena.	  
	  	  
	  	  
II.	   The	   Three	   Ps	   of	   Global	   Economic	   Governance:	   Players,	   Power,	   and	  
Paradigms	  
Defining	  Global	  Economic	  Governance	  
If	  it	  is	  true	  that	  the	  hand	  that	  guides	  the	  markets	  is	  invisible,	  as	  Adam	  Smith	  purported,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  
that	   the	   market	   ‘does	   not	   work	   by	   magic	   or,	   for	   that	   matter,	   by	   voodoo.	   It	   works	   through	  
institutions,	   procedures,	   rules,	   and	   customs’	   (McMillan	   2002,	   8).	   	   We	   define	   global	   economic	  
governance	  here	  to	  be	  the	  international	  rules-­‐based	  framework	  through	  which	  economic	  actors	  (be	  
they	   states,	   firms,	   institutionalized	   agencies,	   organized	   groups,	   or	   individuals)	   seek	   to	   resolve	  
collective	  action	  problems	  and	  promote	  cross-­‐border	  coordination	  and	  cooperation	   in	   the	  provision	  
or	   exchange	   of	   goods,	  money,	   services	   and	   technical	   expertise	   in	   defined	   issue	   areas	   of	   the	  world	  
economy.	  
In	   common	   with	   other	   global	   governance	   areas	   where	   different	   types	   of	   legalized	   arrangements	  
coexist	   (Abbott	   and	   Snidal	   2000),	   global	   economic	   governance	   can	   be	   both	   formal	   and	   informal.	  	  
Formal	   governance	   is	   manifested	   in	   law	   and	   international	   governmental	   institutions	   (e.g.,	   IMF),	  
forums	  (e.g.,	  G20	  and	  Financial	  Stability	  Forum,	  FSF),	  international	  private	  boards	  (e.g.,	  International	  
Accounting	   Standards	   Board,	   IASB),	   and	   international	   non-­‐governmental	   organizations	   (e.g.,	  
Amnesty	  International,	  Greenpeace).	   	  Global	  economic	  governance	  can	  also	  refer	  to	  more	  informal	  
sets	   of	   principles,	   norms	   and	   practices	   (including	   self-­‐governance	   agreements)	   that	   comprise	   a	  
general	  consensus	  among	  defined	  groups	  of	  actors	  about	  appropriate	  behaviour	  in	  key	  issues	  areas.	  	  
The	   Global	   Compact	   and	   Extractive	   Industries	   Transparency	   Initiatives	   governing	   multinational	  
corporations	   or	   several	   international	   arrangements	   for	   prudential	   regulation,	   which	   involve	   a	  
complex,	   interrelated	  set	  of	   informal	  committees	  and	  decentralized	  networks	  engaged	   in	  technical	  
collaboration	  (Porter	  2005),	  are	  two	  cases	  in	  point.	  
From	   an	   instrumental	   or	   functional	   point	   of	   view,	   global	   economic	   governance	   is	   intended	   to	  
promote	   efficiency	   and	   effectiveness	   in	   the	   world	   economy	   and	   to	   correct	   market	   failures	   by	  
producing	  public	  goods,	  such	  as	  financial	  stability,	  which	  would	  be	  otherwise	  at	  risk	  of	  being	  under-­‐
provided.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   as	   a	   system	   of	   governing	   authority,	   it	   is	   expected	   to	   also	  
embody	   accountability	   and	   representation—although	   the	   question	   of	  whose	   interests	   need	   to	   be	  
represented	  and	  who	  should	  be	  accountable	  to	  whom	  is	  itself	  a	  matter	  of	  controversy.	  	  Scholars	  are	  
divided	   between	   those	   who	   advocate	   true	   democratic	   legitimacy,	   making	   global	   economic	  
governance	  mechanisms	  answerable	  to	  individuals	  and	  national	  legislatures,	  and	  those	  who	  support	  
more	   limited	   solutions	   such	   as	   enhancing	   transparency	   and	   expanding	   participation	   as	   remedial	  
actions	  (c.f.,	  Archibugi	  and	  Held	  1995;	  Collins-­‐William	  and	  Wolfe	  2010;	  Mügge,	  Underhill	  and	  Blom	  
2010;	  Scholte	  2011).	  	  Setting	  aside	  the	  question	  of	  what	  the	  most	  appropriate	  instruments	  to	  ensure	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adequate	   representation	   and	   accountability	   in	   global	   economic	   governance	   are,	   it	   is	   also	   worth	  
noting	   that	   there	   is	   quite	   often	   tension	   between	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   goal	   of	  
efficiency/effectiveness	  and	  the	  quest	  for	  legitimacy	  (Higgott	  2012).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  it	  is	  not	  unlikely	  
that	   representation	   and	   accountability	   mechanisms	   need	   to	   be	   subordinated	   for	   efficient	   and	  
effective	  action	  to	  materialize.	  	  Think,	  for	  instance,	  of	  the	  IMF	  crisis	  management	  role.	  	  It	  would	  be	  
very	  difficult	  for	  the	  Fund	  to	  effectively	  quell	  a	  crisis	  should	  it	  seek	  the	  approval	  of	  its	  quasi-­‐universal	  
membership	  before	  being	  allowed	  to	  intervene.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  political	  timing	  does	  not	  always	  
coincide	  with	   the	  market	   timing,	  making	   it	   all	   the	  more	  difficult	   to	   reconcile	   the	   two	   goals	   global	  
economic	  governance	  is	  expected	  to	  achieve.	  
Patterns	   of	   change	   in	   global	   economic	   governance	   can	   be	   traced	   back	   to	   different	   causal	   factors.	  	  
One	   prominent	   explanation	   is	   that	   changes	   in	   global	   economic	   governance	   reflect	   evolving	  
responses	   to	  new	  collective	  action	  or	   coordination	  problems	   that	  arise	   from	   the	  discovery	  of	  new	  
technologies,	   new	   goods	   and	   services,	   and	   means	   of	   production	   and	   exchange.	   	   Such	   change	   is	  
evident	  in	  the	  growth	  or	  adaptation	  (and	  sometimes	  elimination)	  of	  existing	  institutions	  or	  creation	  
of	  new	  forms	  of	  governance.	   	  For	  example,	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  European	  Financial	  Stability	  Facility	  
(EFSF)	   and	   of	   the	   European	   Stabilization	   Mechanisms	   (ESM)	   over	   the	   past	   few	   years	   can	   be	  
interpreted	  as	  a	   response	   to	   the	  new	  problem	  of	   financial	   instability	   in	   the	  Euro	  zone—a	  problem	  
that	  was	  not	  even	  conceived	  when	  the	  European	  Monetary	  Union	  was	  launched	  in	  1991.	  	  Likewise,	  
the	  evolution	  of	   the	   IMF	   lending	   facilities	  can	   largely	  be	  explained	  as	  successive	  responses	   to	  new	  
economic	   problems—be	   they	   development	   issues	   in	   the	   1970s	   (leading	   the	   Fund	   to	   create	   the	  
Extended	   Fund	   Facility)	   or	   capital	   flows	   volatility	   in	   emerging	   economies	   in	   the	   1990s	   (with	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Supplemental	  Reserve	  Facility	  and	  the	  Contingent	  Credit	  Line)	  among	  others.	  
Next	   to	   adaptation	   to	   new	   problems,	   changes	   in	   global	   economic	   governance	   are	   also	   driven	   by	  
contestation	  surrounding	  the	  underlying	  principles,	  rules	  and	  norms	  that	  shape	  formal	  and	  informal	  
governance	   structures	   and	   practices.	   	   This	   is	   the	   potential	   for	   change	   that	   is	   sparked	   by	   tensions	  
between	  the	  so-­‐called	  rule-­‐makers	  and	  rule-­‐takers.	   	  Such	  contestation	  can	  result	  from	  shifts	   in	  the	  
balance	   of	   power	   between	   actors	   in	   the	   world	   economy,	   from	   moments	   of	   crisis	   or	   prolonged	  
periods	  of	  economic	  malaise	  when	  the	  validity	  of	   ideas	  and	  belief	  systems	  undergirding	  status	  quo	  
rules	   and	   policies	   is	   called	   into	   question,	   or	   as	   inequities	   and	   injustices	   in	   extant	   rules-­‐based	  
frameworks	  are	  challenged.	  	  As	  the	  chapters	  in	  this	  handbook	  show,	  the	  result	  of	  such	  contestation	  
may	   be	   continuity,	   deeper	   change,	   or	   something	   in	   between.	   	   Vested	   interests,	   asymmetric	  
bargaining	  power,	  institutional	  lock-­‐in	  and	  inertia,	  sunk	  costs,	  and	  pervasive	  uncertainty	  and	  risk	  all	  
affect	  prospects	  for	  governance	  change.	  
Before	  digging	  into	  the	  web	  of	  factors	  causing	  change	  in	  global	  economic	  governance,	  for	  analytical	  
purposes	  we	  analyse	   these	   factors	   separately.	   	   In	  particular,	   in	  what	   follows,	  we	  examine	   the	   key	  
features	   of	   the	   players,	   power	   and	   paradigms	   whose	   interaction	   shape	   and	   re-­‐shape	   global	  
economic	  governance	  over	  time.	  
Players	  in	  Global	  Economic	  Governance	  
Who	   are	   the	   key	   actors	   and	   institutions	   that	   exercise	   power	   and	   influence	   over	   the	   rule-­‐based	  
frameworks	  in	  global	  economic	  governance?	  	  The	  answer	  given	  to	  this	  question	  reflects	  some	  of	  the	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most	  well-­‐known	  theoretical	  divides	  in	  the	  IPE	  literature.	  	  Explanations	  can	  be	  arranged	  according	  to	  
whether	  they	  identify	  the	  main	  actors	  as	  operating	  at	  the	  domestic,	  inter-­‐state	  or	  international	  and	  
transnational	  level.	  
For	  those	  emphasizing	  the	  domestic	  roots	  of	  global	  economic	  governance,	  the	  key	  players	  are	  well-­‐
organized	  interest	  groups	  that	  lobby	  domestic	  governments	  influencing	  their	  stance	  in	  international	  
negotiations.	   	   This	   explanation	   is	   well	   established	   in	   the	   trade	   literature	   where	   the	   interests	   of	  
business	  and	  farmers’	  groups	  figure	  prominently	  in	  the	  analysis	  (Destler	  and	  Odell	  1987;	  Dür	  2008;	  
Evans	  Jacobson	  and	  Putnam	  1993;	  Grossman	  and	  Helpman	  2002;	  Woll	  2008)	  and	  appeared	  to	  have	  
shaped	   international	  agricultural	  negotiations	  that	  took	  place	  at	  the	  WTO	  between	  1999	  and	  2006	  
(da	  Conceição-­‐Heldt	  2011).	  	  These	  insights	  are	  echoed	  in	  the	  academic	  scholarship	  on	  finance	  where	  
financial	   industry	  groups	  and	  associations	  are	  often	   identified	  as	  one	  of	   the	  primary	  players	   in	   the	  
financial	  regulatory	  arena,	  capable	  of	  steering	  domestic	  and	  international	  financial	  governance	  away	  
from	  measures	  that	  could	  undermine	  their	   interests	  (Underhill	  1995;	  Wood	  2005).	   	  For	   instance,	   it	  
has	   been	   noted	   that	   the	   use	   of	   capital	   controls	   in	   a	   number	   of	   emerging	   market	   nations	   in	   the	  
aftermath	   of	   the	   recent	   crisis	   has	   been	   supported	   by	   some	   important	   domestic	   interest	   groups	  
whose	   economic	   interests	   were	   threatened	   by	   the	   exchange	   rate	   appreciation	   that	   followed	  
financial	  de-­‐leveraging	  in	  advanced	  economies	  (Gallagher	  2012).	  
Next	   to	  domestic	   firms	  and	   interests	  groups,	   scholars	  privileging	  a	  domestic	  perspective	  also	   shed	  
light	  on	  the	  role	  played	  by	  sub-­‐units	  of	  governments	  and	  other	  societal	   interests	  (Seabrooke	  2006;	  
Singer	  2007).	   	  For	  instance,	  some	  of	  the	  most	  important	  global	  financial	  rules	  and	  arrangements	  in	  
the	  banking,	  securities,	  and	  insurance	  sector	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  behaviour	  of	  domestic	  
financial	   regulators	   based	   on	   their	   preferences	   on	   the	   trade-­‐off	   between	   stability	   and	  
competitiveness	   (Singer	   2007).	   	   A	   further	   example	   of	   domestic	   players	   relevant	   for	   governance	  
dynamics	   comes	   from	   the	  European	   context,	  where	  most	  of	   the	  Union	  economic	   and	   governance	  
arrangements	   have	   been	   driven	   by	   the	   activity	   of	   European	   Union	   bureaucrats,	   most	   of	   them	  
working	  for	  the	  European	  Commission	  (Jabko	  2006;	  Posner	  2005).	  
For	  scholars	  that	  explain	  global	  economic	  governance	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  interstate	  interactions	  and	  
negotiations,	   the	   natural	   players	   are	   states.	   	   Scholars	   working	   in	   this	   tradition	   have	   devoted	  
particular	  attention	  to	  the	  preferences	  and	  the	  behaviour	  of	   leading	  states.	   	  Eric	  Helleiner’s	  (1994)	  
and	  Ethan	  Kaspstein’s	   (1994)	  works	  on	   the	  evolution	  of	   the	  global	   financial	   system	  well	   exemplify	  
these	  themes,	  by	  showing	  how	  the	  framework	  for	  governing	  global	  financial	  markets	  could	  not	  have	  
developed	  without	  the	  political	  underpinning	  provided	  by	  leading	  states	  such	  as	  the	  US	  and	  the	  UK.	  
Although	  primary	  attention	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  the	  activity	  of	  leading	  states,	  the	  role	  of	  peripheral	  
or	   small	   states	   has	   not	   gone	   unnoticed.	   	   For	   instance,	   Jason	   Sharman	   (2006)	   provides	   a	   careful	  
examination	   of	   the	  way	   in	  which	   three	   dozen	   small	   tax	   haven	   jurisdictions	   defeated	   a	   large-­‐state	  
coalition	   in	   the	   OECD	   in	   establishing	   the	   rules	   that	   define	   international	   tax	   cooperation.	   	   By	  
exploiting	   the	   costs	   associated	   with	   reputation	   damage,	   the	   small	   states	   engaged	   in	   a	   rhetorical	  
battle	   that	   forced	   the	  organization	  and	   its	   largest	  members	   to	   retreat	   from	  establishing	  global	   tax	  
standards	  that	  would	  have	  ruled	  out	  the	  use	  of	  tax	  concessions	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investment.	  	   In	  a	  
similar	  vein,	  Andrew	  Walter	  (2008)	  has	  shown	  how	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  G7-­‐supported	  global	  financial	  
governance—i.e.,	  the	  one	  based	  on	  international	  financial	  standards	  developed	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	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the	   Asian	   crisis	   in	   1997–98	   and	   modelled	   after	   Western	   practices	   in	   banking	   and	   securities	  
supervision,	   and	   corporate	   governance—has	   been	   hindered	   by	   domestic	   implementation	   in	   a	  
number	  of	  peripheral	  countries	  in	  the	  Asian	  region.	  	  
Examining	   the	   role	   of	   state	   players	   other	   than	   the	   leading	   ones	   is	   also	   of	   particular	   importance	  
following	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   	   Indeed,	   one	   of	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   crisis	   has	   been	   a	   power	  
reshuffle	   in	   favour	   of	   emerging	   markets	   as	   attested,	   among	   others,	   by	   the	   distribution	   of	   global	  
public	  debt	  between	  developed	  and	  emerging	  market	  countries	  (Prasad	  and	  Ding	  2011).	   	  Based	  on	  
this	   power	   shift,	   it	   is	   perfectly	   plausible	   that	   some	  of	   these	   countries,	   such	  as	  China,	  will	   become	  
more	  assertive	  in	  influencing	  the	  international	  governance	  debate	  and	  outcomes.	  	  The	  recognition	  of	  
the	   increasing	   importance	   of	   emerging	  markets	   to	   the	   governance	   of	   the	   global	   economy	   is	   also	  
manifested	   in	   a	  number	  of	   reforms	   to	   the	   international	   financial	   architecture	   that	  have	  expanded	  
the	   membership	   of	   key	   international	   bodies	   (i.e.,	   the	   FSB,	   the	   BCBS,	   and	   the	   Committee	   on	   the	  
Global	   Financial	   System,)	   and	   increased	   the	   weight	   of	   emerging	   and	   developing	   countries	   in	   the	  
policy-­‐making	   processes.	   	   For	   instance,	   in	   December	   2010	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	  
endorsed	  a	  significant	   realignment	  of	   its	  quota	  shares	  resulting	   in	   the	  presence	  of	   the	   four	   largest	  
emerging	  economies	  (Brazil,	  China,	  India,	  and	  Russia)	  among	  its	  ten	  largest	  shareholders.	   	  A	  similar	  
shift	  occurred	  shortly	  after	  at	  the	  World	  Bank,	  including	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  votes	  provided	  to	  China	  
and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  constituency	  seat	  for	  Africa.	  	  
Finally,	   next	   to	   the	   players	   that	   operate	   mainly	   at	   the	   domestic	   and	   interstate	   level,	   the	   IPE	  
scholarship	   has	   also	   devoted	   explicit	   attention	   to	   those	   players	   whose	   primary	   operating	  
environment	  can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  international	  and	  transnational	   level.	   	   International	  organizations	  
are	   the	   first	  and	  obvious	  examples	  here.	   	   Indeed,	  an	   important	  strand	   in	   IO	  scholarship	   is	   the	  one	  
that	  seeks	  to	  explain	  how	  these	  players	  autonomously	  and	  powerfully	  shape	  the	  content	  and	  rules	  
that	  inform	  global	  economic	  governance	  at	  specific	  points	  in	  time.	   	  Here,	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  
WTO	  or	   the	   international	   financial	   institutions	  are	   the	  ones	   that	  have	   received	   the	  most	  attention	  
particularly	  because	  of	  their	  quasi-­‐universal	  membership	  that	  make	  them	  particularly	  well-­‐placed	  to	  
influence	   global	   governance	  dynamics	   (Barnett	   and	   Finnemore	  2004;	  Abdelal	   2007;	  Weaver	   2008;	  
Avant,	  Finnemore	  and	  Sell	  2010;	  Park	  and	  Vetterlein	  2010;	  Chwieroth	  2010).	  
International	   organizations	   do	   not	   exhaust	   the	   list	   of	   players	   whose	   activity	   has	   important	  
consequences	  for	  GEG.	  	  Indeed,	  in	  line	  with	  one	  of	  the	  key	  developments	  of	  global	  governance	  in	  the	  
past	   decades,	   global	   economic	   governance	   appears	   to	   be	   increasingly	   shaped	   by	   the	   activity	   of	   a	  
complex	   global	   web	   of	   policy	   networks	   (Slaughter	   2004).	   	   These	   networks	   have	   different	  
composition	  according	  to	  the	  issue	  area	  in	  which	  they	  are	  involved,	  thus	  members	  may	  include	  trade	  
specialists,	  financial	  regulators	  or	  government	  officials.	   	   In	  spite	  of	  different	  composition,	  networks	  
in	  GEG	  share	  a	  number	  of	  important	  characteristics:	  they	  are	  usually	  expert	  bodies	  that	  operate	  on	  a	  
transgovernmental	  or	   transnational	   level	   that,	   in	   turn,	   favours	   the	   formation	  of	  common	  mindsets	  
and	  preserves	  their	   isolation	  from	  political	  pressures.	   	  These	  arguments	  have	  been	  most	   forcefully	  
explored	   in	  a	  number	  of	  works	   in	  global	   financial	  governance.	   	   Specifically,	   it	  has	  been	  noted	   that	  
governance	  arrangements	  are	  highly	  influenced	  by	  small	  groupings	  of	  experts	  that	  develop	  common	  
beliefs	   and	   shared	   understandings	   via	   processes	   of	   deliberation	   and	   information	   exchange	   (Baker	  
2006;	   McNamara	   1998;	   Tsingou	   2009).	   	   This	   commonality	   may	   also	   derive	   from	   patterns	   of	  
recruitment	  and	  common	  professional	  and	  educational	  backgrounds	  (Chwieroth	  2008).	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At	   the	   transnational	   level,	   both	   profit	   and	   non-­‐profit	   private	   actors	   are	   also	   important	   players.	  	  
Financial	   industry	  groups	  and	  associations	  well	  represent	  the	  first	  group	  of	  actors.	   	   Indeed,	  several	  
studies	   indicate	   how	   their	   influence	   on	   global	   financial	   governance	   has	   been	   exerted	   directly	   on	  
international	  regulatory	  bodies,	  that	   is,	  by	  bypassing	  national	  governments.	   	  This	  circumstance	  has	  
led	   several	   observers	   to	   identify	   the	  phenomenon	  of	   ‘transnational	   regulatory	   capture’—although	  
there	  is	  evidence	  that	  their	  influence	  on	  global	  financial	  governance	  has	  been	  exaggerated	  in	  some	  
cases	  (Young	  2012).	  	  Private	  actors	  may	  also	  influence	  the	  workings	  of	  international	  organizations	  by	  
shifting	   the	   focus	   of	   their	   activities.	   	   For	   instance,	   private	   financial	   intermediaries	   appear	   able	   to	  
influence	   the	   conditions	   included	   in	   IMF	   programs	   because	   their	   financing	   is	   necessary	   for	   the	  
success	  of	  Fund-­‐designed	  programs	  (Gould	  2003).	   	  Non-­‐profit	  private	  groups,	  such	  as	  transnational	  
advocacy	   groups,	   may	   also	   exert	   similar	   influence	   when	   their	   claims	   are	   supported	   by	   key	   state	  
players	   (Broome	   2009)	   or	   by	   sympathetic	   staff	   members	   within	   international	   organizations	   (Park	  
2005;	  Woods	  2006;	  Weaver	  2008;	  Park	  and	  Vetterlein	  2010).	  
As	   this	   brief	   overview	  of	   some	  of	   the	  major	   themes	   in	   the	   IPE	   literature	   reveals,	   global	   economic	  
governance	   is	   a	   very	   crowded	   arena	   including	   players	   as	   diverse	   as	   states,	   intergovernmental	  
organizations,	  expert	  bodies	  and	  private	  actors.	  	  To	  complicate	  the	  landscape,	  these	  players	  tend	  to	  
intermingle.	  	  They	  do	  not	  solely	  move	  from	  one	  policy	  realm	  to	  another,	  as	  is	  the	  case,	  for	  instance,	  
of	  the	  IMF’s	  involvement	  in	  financial	  stability	  as	  well	  as	  development	  issues.	  	  They	  also	  switch	  from	  
the	   private	   to	   the	   public	   sector	   and	   vice	   versa	   through	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   ‘revolving	   doors’	  
(Seabrooke	   and	   Tsingou	   2009),	   making	   the	   task	   of	   identifying	   the	   key	   players	   difficult	   and	   time-­‐
sensitive.	   	   Indeed,	  players,	   their	   influence,	  and	  their	  policy	  position	  change	  significantly	  over	   time,	  
thus	  inviting	  investigation	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  such	  change.	  	  
Changes	   in	   material	   and	   social	   power	   and	   paradigms,	   as	   discussed	   in	   the	   following	   sections,	   are	  
certainly	  key	   in	   this	   respect.	   	   Indeed,	   identifying	  the	  key	  players	   in	  GEG	   is	  strictly	  dependent	  upon	  
the	   sources	   of	   power	   the	   players	   command	   and	   upon	   dominant	   understandings	   about	   how	   the	  
global	  economy	  should	  work.	   	  Nevertheless,	   it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  focus	  on	  one	  factor	  over	  the	  
others	  as	  the	  ultimate	  cause	  of	  change.	  	  Players	  are	  not	  solely	  constituted	  by	  changes	  in	  power	  and	  
paradigms	  but	   they	   themselves	   constitute	   those	   same	   sources	   of	   power	   and	   reinforce	   or	  weaken	  
economic	  paradigms.	  	  
Power	  and	  Global	  Economic	  Governance	  
As	   in	   any	   form	   of	   government,	   the	   working	   of	   global	   economic	   governance	   is	   dependent	   on	   the	  
exercise	  of	  power	   in	  order	  to	  generate	  the	   ‘system	  of	  rules’	   that	  guide	  the	  behaviour	  of	  economic	  
actors	  and	  stabilize	  their	  expectations	  (Rosenau	  1992,	  4).	   	  The	  production	  of	  rules,	  however,	  is	  just	  
one	   of	   the	  many	   forms	   through	  which	   power	   is	   exercised	   (for	   a	   representative	   argument	   of	   this	  
point	  see	  Bachrach	  and	  Baratz	  1962;	  also	  Barnett	  and	  Duvall	  2005).	  	  Limiting	  our	  analysis	  to	  the	  case	  
of	   global	   economic	   governance,	   and	  with	   no	   claim	  of	   being	   exhaustive,	   there	   are	   several	  ways	   in	  
which	  power	  manifests	  itself.	  	  For	  instance,	  power	  does	  not	  solely	  entail	  deciding	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  
other	  actors	  play	  but	  it	  also	  refers	  to	  the	  capacity	  of	  setting	  political	  agendas	  and	  taking	  actions	  to	  
enforce	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   game.	   	   These	   actions	   can	   be	   used	   to	   punish,	   coerce	   or	   shame	   actors	  
engaging	   in	   deviant	   behaviour.	   	   The	   IFIs,	   bond	   markets	   and	   credit	   rating	   agencies	   all	   seem	   to	  
exercise	  this	  form	  of	  power	  in	  global	  economic	  governance	  (Hardie	  2011;	  Sinclair	  2005).	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The	  nature	  of	  power	  can	  also	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  controlling	  access	  to	  the	  resources	  that	  other	  
actors	   crave	  or	   need.	   	   This	   form	  of	   power	   is	  well-­‐exemplified	   in	   the	   ‘international	   organization	  of	  
credit’	  where	  power	  is	  a	  function	  of	  who	  controls	  the	  access	  of	  others	  to	  credit,	  who	  is	  privileged	  by	  
access	  to	  credit,	  and	  who	  reaps	  the	  advantage	  which	  access	  to	  credit	  implies	  (Germain	  1997;	  Strange	  
1988).	  	  Furthermore,	  another	  form	  of	  power	  is	  the	  one	  that	  is	  manifested	  by	  gaining	  control	  over	  the	  
economic	  destiny	  of	  other	  players	  as	   is	   the	  case,	   for	   instance,	  when	  a	  bloc	  of	  countries	  adopt	   the	  
currency	   of	   a	   country	   outside	   the	   bloc	   as	   a	   peg	   or	   as	   the	   means	   o	   international	   transactions	  	  
(Kirshner	  1995).	  	  In	  short,	  the	  nature	  of	  power	  is	  far	  from	  uniform	  and	  more	  than	  one	  form	  of	  power	  
may	  be	  exercised	  at	  the	  same	  time.	  	  	  
Power	   also	   stems	   from	   very	   different	   sources	   and	   scholars	   have	   tended	   to	   emphasize	   one	   over	  
others	  according	  to	  their	   theoretical	  alignment.	   	   In	  general,	  sources	  of	  power	  can	  be	  distinguished	  
based	   on	   their	   hard	   or	   soft	   nature:	   the	   former	   refers	   to	   material	   resources	   whereas	   the	   second	  
stresses	  the	  consequences	  of	  shared	  understandings.	  	  Those	  accounts	  that	  choose	  not	  to	  emphasize	  
either	  of	   these	  factors	  take	  as	  their	  starting	  point	  the	  role	  played	  by	  formal	   institutions	   in	  shaping	  
power	   relationships.	   	   In	  what	   follows,	  we	  analyse	  each	  of	   these	   sources	  of	  power	   in	   turn.	   	  Before	  
doing	   that,	   however,	   it	   is	  worth	   noting	   that	  while	   some	   of	   the	   sources	   of	   power	   analysed	   below	  
solely	  apply	  to	  states,	  these	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  empower	  both	  state	  and	  non-­‐state	  actors.	  
For	   scholars	   adopting	   the	   first	   perspective,	  market	   size	   figures	   prominently	   in	   the	   list	   of	  material	  
conditions	  from	  which	  power	  in	  global	  economic	  governance	  stems	  from	  (Drezner	  2007;	  Gilpin	  1981,	  
1987).	   	   This	   factor	   plays,	   of	   course,	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   the	   biggest	   states	   in	   the	   economic	   system.	  	  
Indeed,	   market	   size	   endows	   great	   powers	   with	   the	   option	   of	   economic	   coercion	   as	   a	   way	   of	  
convincing	  other	  actors	  to	  change	  their	  economic	  rules	  and	  institutions	  in	  line	  with	  those	  preferred	  
by	  the	  great	  powers.	  	  A	  corollary	  of	  this	  line	  of	  thinking	  is	  that	  leading	  states	  have	  an	  advantage	  in	  
setting	  international	  rules	  because	  they	  set	  the	  economic	  practices	  that	  other	  states	  may	  decide	  to	  
emulate	  or	  diverge	  from	  at	  their	  cost	  (Simmons	  2001).	  
Next	   to	   market	   size,	   the	   material	   resources	   that	   shape	   power	   relationships	   in	   global	   economic	  
governance	  include	  the	  availability	  of	   information	  and	  financial	  resources	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  set	  the	  
terms	  of	  access	  to	  these	  resources.	  	  Seen	  from	  this	  perspective,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  IFIs	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  cash-­‐
poor	   developing	   countries	   derives	   exactly	   from	   the	  material	   resources	   that	   these	   institutions	   are	  
able	   to	  mobilize	  and	   the	  credit	   signals	   that	   they	  send	   to	  other	  market	  actors.	   	  The	  support	  of	  key	  
players	   can	   also	   be	   added	   to	   the	   list	   of	   sources	   of	   material	   power.	   For	   instance,	   Daniel	   Drezner	  
(2007)	  has	  made	  the	  case	  that	  club-­‐like	  financial	  governance	  institutions—international	  bodies	  with	  
limited	   membership	   and	   high	   degrees	   of	   like-­‐mindedness	   among	   members—have	   replaced	   the	  
international	  financial	  institutions	  (IFIs)	  as	  the	  pillars	  of	  the	  international	  financial	  regulatory	  system	  
because	  the	  former	  better	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  economically	  advanced	  countries.	  	  Finally,	  another	  
important	   source	  of	  material	   power	   in	  GEG	   is	   the	  one	   that	   stems	   from	  external	   liquidity	  position.	  	  
From	  this	  perspective,	  GEG	  is	  mainly	  conceived	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  battle	  between	  creditors	  and	  
debtors	  and	  their	  search	  for	  wealth	  (Palan	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  Over	  time,	  there	  have	  been	  crises—i.e.,	  the	  
1930s,	   the	  1970s,	  and	  the	  present	  crisis—after	  which	  a	  new	  economic	  order	  came	   into	  place;	  and	  
new	  order	  tended	  to	  be	  set	  by	  the	  creditor	  nation	  (Coggan	  2012).	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A	  rival	  interpretation	  of	  power	  in	  global	  economic	  governance	  is	  provided	  by	  scholars	  who	  stress	  its	  
social	  or	  normative	  foundations.	  	  Social	  power	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  ‘the	  ability	  to	  set	  standards,	  create	  
norms	   and	   values	   that	   are	   deemed	   legitimate	   and	   desirable,	   without	   resorting	   to	   coercion	   or	  
payment’	   (van	   Ham	   2010).	   	   This	   definition	   captures	   two	   important	   features	   of	   power:	   its	   non-­‐
coercive	   sources	   and	   its	   claims	   to	   legitimacy.	   	   To	   start	   with,	   the	   sources	   of	   power	   are	   conceived	  
primarily	  as	  related	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  persuasion	  that	  stems	  from	  the	  ability	  to	  define	  meanings	  and	  
constitute	   reality.	   	   Barnett	   and	   Finnemore	   (2004,	   6)	   have	   provided	   one	   of	   the	   most	   convincing	  
examples	  of	  these	  sources	  of	  power	  in	  their	  study	  of	  IOs	  by	  showing	  that	  these	  players	  ‘are	  powerful	  
not	  so	  much	  because	  they	  possess	  material	  and	   informational	   resources	  but,	  more	  fundamentally,	  
because	  they	  use	  their	  authority	  to	  orient	  action	  and	  create	  social	  reality’.	  	  Technical	  knowledge	  and	  
processes	  of	  socialization	  are	  important	  supporting	  factors	  in	  this	  respect.	  	  Indeed,	  technical,	  expert	  
cooperation	   tends	   to	   foster	   cognitive	  convergence	  and	  shared	  understandings	   that,	   in	   turn,	   shape	  
the	   goals	   and	   instruments	   of	   economic	   governance,	   from	   monetary	   cooperation	   to	   regulatory	  
intervention	  (e.g.,	  McNamara	  1998;	  Porter	  2005;	  Abdelal,	  Blyth	  and	  Parsons	  2010).	  
One	  core	  concept	  associated	  with	  the	  social	   foundations	  of	  power	   is	   legitimacy.	   	   In	  particular,	   this	  
concept	   reminds	   us	   that	   those	  who	   govern	   are	   compelled	   to	  make	   claims	   to	   the	   rightfulness	   and	  
fairness	  of	  their	  actions,	  and	  that	  those	  who	  are	  governed	  have	  some	  capacity	  to	  reject	  or	  approve	  
these	  claims	  (Seabrooke	  2006).	  	  As	  a	  result,	  legitimacy	  is	  more	  than	  a	  property	  that	  global	  economic	  
governance	   can	   acquire	   through	   institutional	   reforms,	   such	   as	   decision-­‐making	   and	   governance	  
reforms.	   	   Rather,	   legitimacy	   is	   an	   inter-­‐subjective	   belief	   about	   how	   and	  why	   to	   govern	   the	  world	  
economy	  and	  it	  is	  thereby	  dependent	  on	  a	  collective	  audience	  to	  be	  sustained	  over	  time	  (Moschella	  
2009).	   	   Thus,	   understanding	   this	   dynamic	   relationship	   between	   rulers	   and	   ruled	   permits	   us	   to	  
develop	   a	   deeper	   understanding	   of	   the	   stability	   (or	   instability)	   of	   global	   economic	   governance	   in	  
different	  periods	  of	  time.	  
Finally,	   another	   explanation	   of	   power	   in	   global	   economic	   governance	   focuses	   on	   its	   institutional	  
determinants.	  	  Studies	  in	  this	  tradition	  include	  those	  adopting	  a	  principal-­‐agent	  (PA)	  approach	  to	  the	  
study	  of	  IOs.	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  power	  of	  an	  international	  agent	  is	  strictly	  dependent	  upon	  
the	  terms	  of	  delegation,	   including	  both	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  mandate	  and	  the	  control	  mechanisms	  set	  
up	  to	  minimize	  episodes	  of	  agency	  slack	  (Hawkins	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  This	  sensitivity	  to	  institutional	  factors	  
is	  embraced	  by	  scholars	  whose	  work	  explores	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  and	  the	  channels	  for	  veto	  
players	   in	   international	   economic	   institutions.	   	   These	   institutional	   factors	   may	   help	   explain,	   for	  
instance,	  the	  continuing	  power	  of	  the	  EU	  within	  the	  IMF	  in	  spite	  of	  its	  decreased	  economic	  weight	  in	  
the	  world	  economy	  as	  compared	  to	  most	  emerging	  market	  countries	  (Bini-­‐Smaghi	  2004).	  	  In	  a	  similar	  
vein,	  the	  procedures	  that	  the	  Basel	  Committee	  employs	  to	  consult	  the	  banking	  sector	  when	  drafting	  
its	  regulatory	  standards	  are	  considered	  an	  important	  source	  of	  power	  for	  the	  private	  actors	  that	  gain	  
access	   to	   the	   decision-­‐making	   process	   (Young	   2012).	   	   The	   location	   that	   players	   occupy	   in	   the	  
international	  policy	  network	  also	  adds	  to	  the	  list	  of	  institutional	  factors	  that	  increase	  the	  influence	  of	  
certain	  players	  over	  the	  others	  (Baker	  2012).	  
Taking	  an	  historical	  institutionalist	  approach,	  some	  authors	  (Bach	  and	  Newman	  2007;	  Fioretos	  2010)	  
have	  also	  noted	  that	  the	  sources	  of	  power	  at	  the	  global	  stage	  lie	  in	  domestic	  regulatory	  institutions.	  	  
A	   key	   concept	   used	   by	   this	   literature	   is	   ‘regulatory	   capacity’	   defined	   as	   ‘a	   jurisdiction’s	   ability	   to	  
formulate,	   monitor,	   and	   enforce	   a	   set	   of	   market	   rules’	   (Bach	   and	   Newman	   2007;	   831).	   	   Political	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centralization	  in	  domestic	  jurisdiction	  may	  also	  increase	  the	  power	  that	  may	  be	  used	  in	  international	  
contexts	  shaping	  GEG	  rules	  and	  practices	  (Posner	  2009).	   	  Domestic	  firms	  may	  also	   influence	  global	  
governance	  arrangements	  based	  on	  their	  organization	  within	  the	  nation-­‐state.	   	  For	   instance,	   it	  has	  
been	   found	   that	   that	   firms	  operating	   in	   a	   hierarchical	   and	   coordinated	  domestic	   system	  are	  well-­‐
positioned	   to	   influence	   the	  outcome	  of	   global	   standardization	  processes	  because	   their	   system	   fits	  
more	  naturally	  with	  the	  global	  structure,	  where	  a	  single	  regulator	  is	  the	  clear	  focal	  point	  (Büthe	  and	  
Mattli	  2011).	  
These	  observations	  on	   the	  nature	  and	  sources	  of	  power	   lead	  us	   to	  emphasize	  a	  number	  of	  points	  
that	  will	  also	  emerge	  from	  the	  case-­‐studies	  that	  follow.	  	  To	  start	  with,	  social	  and	  material	  power	  is	  
not	  confined	  to	  states	  or	  the	  public	  sector	  in	  general,	  as	  embodied,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  workings	  of	  
intergovernmental	   organizations.	   	   Instead,	   power	   may	   well	   be	   exercised	   by	   a	   variety	   of	   players	  
ranging	   from	   groups	   of	   regulators	   who	   usually	   operate	   out	   of	   the	   limelight	   of	   public	   scrutiny	   to	  
private	  sector	  actors.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  sources	  of	  power	  are	  hardly	  constant	  but	  rather	  subject	  to	  
evolution	  because	  of	  changes	  in	  underlying	  market	  or	  normative	  conditions.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  rise	  of	  
the	   BRICS’	   markets,	   whose	   economic	   potential	   is	   often	   invoked	   to	   sustain	   global	   demand	   in	   the	  
aftermath	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis,	  challenges	  existing	  power	  relationships	  based	  on	  market	  size	  
dynamics.	   	  Likewise,	  the	  ongoing	  reforms	  to	  the	  Fund’s	  governance	  structure,	  although	  still	   limited	  
in	   scope,	   could	   trigger	   consequences	   for	   the	   repartition	   of	   power	   in	   GEG	   that	   are	   not	   easily	  
anticipated	  or	  deliberately	  designed	  at	  this	  stage.	   	  Changes	  in	  power	  can	  also	  be	  brought	  about	  by	  
changes	   in	   legitimacy	  perceptions	  which	  may,	   in	   turn,	  be	   related	   to	  changes	   in	  market	   shares	  and	  
institutionalized	  procedures.	   	   Legitimacy	  crises	  may	  also	  be	   ignited	  by	  policy	   failures	  and	   technical	  
inefficiency	   that	   catalyse	   public	   attention.	   	   These	   are	   precisely	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	   post-­‐crisis	  
environment,	   which	   has	   been	   characterized	   by	   an	   unusual	   politicization	   of	   the	   debate	   around	  
financial	  regulatory	  issues	  (Helleiner,	  Pagliari	  and	  Zimmermann	  2009;	  Moschella	  and	  Tsingou	  2012;	  
Veròn	   2012;	   Young	   and	   Pagliari	   2012).	   	   These	   changes	   in	   the	   policy-­‐making	   context	   have	   set	   the	  
stage	   for	   the	  contestation	  of	   the	   ‘quiet	  power’	   that	  public	  and	  private	  sector	   regulators	  have	   long	  
exercised	  in	  global	  financial	  governance	  and	  that	  had	  largely	  gone	  unnoticed	  before	  the	  crisis	  burst.	  
Paradigms	  in	  Global	  Economic	  Governance	  
Finally,	  the	  activity	  of	  players	  and	  the	  sources	  of	  power	   in	  GEG	  are	  reinforced	  or	  weakened	  by	  the	  
existence	   of	   policy	   paradigms.	   	   Specifically,	   paradigms	   can	   be	   defined	   as	   a	   ‘system	   of	   ideas	   and	  
standards	  that	  specifies	  not	  only	  the	  goals	  of	  policy	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  instruments	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
attain	  them,	  but	  also	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  problems	  they	  are	  meant	  to	  be	  addressing’	  (Hall	  1993,	  
279).	   	   Thus,	   paradigms	   do	   not	   simply	   regulate	   behaviour.	   	   They	   also	   serve	   as	   interpretative	   and	  
constitutive	  devices	  in	  that	  they	  shape	  how	  people	  understand	  political-­‐economic	  problems,	  define	  
their	   goals	   and	   strategies,	   and	   settle	   on	   specific	   policy	   solutions	   (Blyth	   2002;	   Abdelal,	   Blyth	   and	  
Parsons	  2010a).	   	  Although	  paradigms	  could	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  source	  of	  power	  for	  those	  players	  who	  
support	  their	  adoption,	  they	  also	  often	  independently	  shape	  global	  economic	  governance.	  	  Indeed,	  
once	  a	  paradigm	  becomes	  instantiated	  into	  the	  rules	  and	  institutions	  that	  govern	  a	  specific	  area	  of	  
economic	   activity,	   its	   effects	   may	   no	   longer	   be	   dependent	   on	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   players	   that	  
contributed	  to	  their	  emergence	  and	  acceptance.	  	  Rather,	  a	  paradigm	  ‘is	  influential	  precisely	  because	  
so	  much	  of	  it	  is	  taken	  for	  granted	  and	  unamenable	  to	  scrutiny	  as	  a	  whole’	  (Hall	  1993,	  279).	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Paradigms	  thus	  constitute	  a	  potent	  source	  of	  stability	   (or,	  alternatively,	   inertia).	   	  Once	  a	  paradigm	  
becomes	  crystallized	  in	  formal	  institutions	  and	  informal	  practices,	   it	  stabilizes	  players’	  expectations	  
about	   how	   the	   world	   economy	   works	   and	   legitimizes	   the	   goals	   set	   by	   specific	   players	   and	   the	  
instruments	  they	  adopt	  for	  solving	  economic	  problems.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  paradigms	  reinforce	  structures	  
of	   power	   in	   that	   those	  who	   set	   the	   rules	   gained	   their	   authority	   from	   the	   perceived	   credibility	   of	  
dominant	  ideational	  frameworks.	  	  Like	  institutions,	  paradigms	  can	  be	  sticky	  due	  to	  vested	  interests	  
or	  habitus.	  	  In	  short,	  there	  are	  positive	  feedback	  loops	  between	  paradigms,	  players	  and	  power.	  	  
The	   feedback	   loop,	  however,	   is	  not	  necessarily	   self-­‐reinforcing.	   	   It	  may	  well	  break	  down	  triggering	  
important	  consequences	  for	  GEG.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  positive,	  self-­‐reinforcing	  loop	  between	  players,	  
power	  and	  paradigms	  can	  be	  interrupted	  because	  the	  latter	  are	  called	  into	  question	  by	  changes	  at	  
the	  level	  of	  both	  players	  and	  source	  of	  power.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  economic	  powers	  can	  
challenge	   dominant	   understandings	   about	   how	   the	   economy	   should	   work	   and	   be	   organized,	  
especially	  when	   this	   rise	   is	   accompanied	  by	   the	  economic	  decline	  of	   previously	  dominant	  players.	  	  
These	   are	  precisely	   the	   conditions	   in	   the	  post-­‐crisis	   environment.	   	  With	  most	   of	   these	   economies	  
mired	  in	  recession	  and	  hostage	  to	  bond	  markets,	  one	  of	  the	  lessons	  that	  can	  be	  insinuated	  from	  the	  
global	   financial	   crisis	   is	   that	   the	  West	  may	  not	   have	  much	   to	   teach	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world	  when	   it	  
comes	  to	  organizing	  a	  sound	  financial	  system.	  	  The	  impact	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  on	  the	  real	  economy	  
has	  also	  called	  into	  question	  the	  fundamental	  legitimacy	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  Western	  development	  
models	  that	  looked	  down	  upon	  state	  intervention	  in	  the	  market	  as	  a	  means	  of	  fostering	  strong	  and	  
stable	   macroeconomic	   growth	   and	   innovation	   (Mahatir	   2012).	   	   In	   this	   context,	   ‘key	   Asian	  
governments,	  especially	  China	  and	  India,	  are	  increasingly	  disinclined	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  continue	  as	  rule-­‐
takers	   rather	   than	  rule-­‐makers	   in	   the	   international	  system’—although	   it	   is	   still	   far	   from	  clear	  what	  
rules	  they	  are	  likely	  to	  want	  to	  make	  thus	  casting	  doubt	  on	  whether	  or	  in	  what	  ways	  a	  power	  shift	  in	  
Asia	  would	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  world	  order	  (Florini	  2011,	  25).	  
	  
Paradigm	  change	  can	  also	  be	  triggered	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  sources	  of	  power	  such	  as	  repeated	  policy	  
failures	   that	   undermine	   the	   technical	   base	   that	   informs	   much	   of	   contemporary	   global	   economic	  
governance	   (Porter	  2003).	   	  Changes	   in	   institutional	  sources	  of	  power,	  such	  as	   the	  quota	  and	  voice	  
reforms	  at	  the	  IMF,	  World	  Bank,	  FSF	  and	  G20,	  may	  also	  trigger	  paradigm	  change	  by	  opening	  debate	  
to	   alternative	  ways	   of	   thinking	   about	   the	   organization	   of	   the	   global	   economy.	   	   For	   instance,	   new	  
institutional	  channels	  can	  provide	  new	  sovereign	  and	  private	  aid	  donors	  with	  the	  means	  to	  challenge	  
conventional	   philosophies	   and	  operational	  modes	  of	   providing	  development	   assistance	   (Findley	   in	  
this	   Handbook;	   Buthe	   in	   this	   Handbook).	   	   This	   pattern	   is	   already	   evident	   in	   the	   development	  
assistance	   provided	   by	   China	   (now	   arguably	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   bilateral	   aid	   donors	   in	   the	   world)	  
which	  explicitly	  challenges	  traditional	  definitions	  of	  Western	  aid	  by	  blending	  investment	  and	  aid	  and	  
intentionally	   invoking	   the	   rhetoric	   of	   ‘partnerships’	   as	   opposed	   to	   external	   assistance	   (Brautigam	  
2009;	  Woods	  2008;	  Grabel	  2012).	  
Another	  channel	  of	  paradigm	  change	  can	  be	  found	  in	  authority	  contests	  during	  which	  several	  players	  
fight	  each	  other	  to	  establish	  their	  vision	  about	  how	  the	  world	  works	  (Blyth	  forthcoming).	  	  Discontent	  
is	  usually	  a	  powerful	  trigger	  here:	  rising	  unemployment,	  falling	  living	  standards	  and	  stagnant	  output	  
or	  recession	  may	  combine	  to	  exhaust	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  rule-­‐makers	  and	  tempt	  their	  opponents	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to	  attack	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  existing	  economic	  organization.	   	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street,	   the	  Spanish	  
indignados	  and	  the	  other	  grassroots	  movements	  that	  spread	  throughout	  2011	  are	  perhaps	  the	  most	  
obvious	  recent	  examples.	  	  Indeed,	  these	  groups	  have	  attacked	  some	  of	  the	  core	  tenets	  of	  dominant	  
economic	   models,	   rejecting	   austerity	   as	   a	   route	   to	   economic	   recovery	   and	   calling	   for	   genuinely	  
transparent	   and	   effective	   regulation	   of	   the	   financial	   system.	   	   In	   doing	   so,	   they	   have	   attacked	   the	  
perceived	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  private	  and	  public	  sector	  actors	  still	  clinging	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  
markets	  worked	  best	  free	  of	  government	  regulation	  and	  they	  have	  pushed	  for	  new	  institutions	  and	  
rules	   to	   govern	   global	   finance	   in	   ways	   that	   shift	   power	   and	   authority	   from	   the	   ‘1%’	   to	   the	  
democratically	  represented	  ‘99%’.	  
The	  discussion	  thus	  far	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  suggest	  that	  paradigms	  are	  easy	  to	  change.	  	  To	  the	  contrary,	  
as	  Keynes	  has	  long	  noted	  ‘the	  difficulty	  lies,	  not	  in	  the	  new	  ideas,	  but	  in	  escaping	  from	  the	  old	  ones,	  
which	  ramify,	  for	  those	  brought	  up	  as	  most	  of	  us	  have	  been,	  into	  every	  corner	  of	  our	  minds’	  (Keynes	  
1936,	   viii).	   	   In	   short,	   it	   is	   very	   difficult	   to	   dismantle	   old	   systems	   of	   ideas.	   	   Several	   factors	   usually	  
hinder	  the	  process	  of	  change.	  	  These	  include	  among	  others	  the	  concentration	  of	  power	  in	  a	  limited	  
number	   of	   players,	   vested	   interests	   in	   dominant	   institutional	   positions,	   gaps	   in	   implementation	  
capacity,	  bureaucratic	  inertia	  and	  the	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  decision-­‐making	  context	  (Moschella	  and	  
Tsingou	  2012;	  Robert	  Wade	  1996;	  Broad	  2006;	  Güven	  2012).	  	  Hence,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  foregone	  conclusion	  
that	  paradigms	  will	  change	  even	  when	  their	  core	  ideas	  and	  resulting	  policies	  are	  widely	  discredited.	  	  
The	   global	   financial	   crisis	   initiated	   in	   2007–08	   has	   offered	   one	   of	   the	  most	   vivid	   examples	   of	   the	  
importance	   of	   stability/change	   of	   paradigms	   to	   global	   economic	   governance	   dynamics.	   	   Indeed,	  
before	  the	  crisis	  erupted,	  global	  financial	  governance	  was	  strongly	  rooted	  in	  the	  tenets	  of	  orthodox	  
economics	  and	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  unbridled	  pursuit	  of	  rational	  self-­‐interest	  and	  profit,	  disciplined	  by	  
the	   self-­‐regulating	   market	   economy,	   would	   yield	   systemic	   long-­‐term	   stability	   and	   growth	   (Baker	  
2012).	   	   This	  unquestioned	  adherence	   to	   the	  efficient	  market	  hypotheses	  was	  part	  of	  what	   can	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  policy	  paradigm,	  embraced	  during	   the	  era	  of	   the	   ‘Great	  Moderation’	   from	   the	  mid-­‐
1980s	   up	   to	   the	   eve	   of	   the	   financial	   crash	   in	   2007	   (Quiggin	   2010).	   	   The	   inherent	   prescription	  
embedded	   in	  this	  paradigm	  was	  that	  public	  authorities	  should	  adopt	  a	   ‘hands-­‐off’	  regulatory	  style,	  
letting	  market	  discipline	  exercise	  its	  stabilizing	  force	  and	  letting	  private	  actors	  decide	  when	  and	  how	  
to	  self-­‐regulate	  (Germain	  2010;	  Helleiner,	  Pagliari	  and	  Zimmermann	  2009;	  Moschella	  2010).	  	  Within	  
this	  interpretative	  framework,	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  believe	  that	  ‘prices	  generated	  by	  financial	  markets	  
represent	  the	  best	  estimate	  of	  the	  value	  of	  any	  investment’	  (Quiggin	  2010,	  2),	  thus	  lending	  support	  
to	   the	   view	   that	   the	   private	   sector	   ‘knows	   best’	   (Kodres	   and	   Narain	   2010,	   4).	   	   In	   other	  words,	   a	  
specific	  world	   view	  of	   financial	  markets,	   emphasizing	   their	   self-­‐stabilizing	  quality	   in	   virtue	  of	   their	  
rational	  efficiency	  and	  capacity	  to	  process	  and	  respond	  to	  information,	  coloured	  the	  governance	  of	  
global	  finance	  in	  the	  period	  that	  preceded	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  (Best	  2010;	  Blyth	  2003).	  
This	  set	  of	  ideas	  had	  important	  policy	  implications.	  	  As	  anticipated,	  its	  embrace	  meant	  the	  adoption	  
of	   a	   hands-­‐off	   regulatory	   and	   supervisory	   approach	   over	   the	   activities	   of	   market	   actors	   with	   the	  
attendant	  build-­‐up	  of	  leverage	  and	  financial	  risks	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  approach	  
favoured	   the	   phenomenon	   known	   as	   ‘intellectual	   capture’.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   the	   then-­‐dominant	  
regulatory	  approach	   that	  blinded	  policy-­‐makers	  and	   regulators	   to	   the	  emerging	   risks	  and	  even	   led	  
them	  to	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  major	  financial	  crisis	   in	   large	  advanced	  economies	  was	  likely	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(IEO	  2011).	   	   In	   short,	   the	  pre-­‐crisis	  dominant	  paradigm	   is	   certainly	  among	   the	   contributing	   causes	  
that	  led	  to	  the	  crisis—a	  failure	  that	  has	  opened	  the	  door	  to	  a	  profound	  rethink	  in	  several	  areas.	  
Indeed,	   as	   the	   world	   economy	   has	   succumbed	   to	   stress,	   so	   also	   have	  many	   of	   the	   old	   pre-­‐crisis	  
certainties.	   	   For	  example,	   the	  crisis	  has	   shaken	   the	  belief	   that	   central	  banks	   should	   focus	  on	  price	  
stability	  and	  ignore	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  credit	  bubbles;	  that	  the	  main	  source	  of	  financial	  instability	  lie	  in	  
emerging	  market	  economies;	   that	   these	   same	  economies	  can	  be	  decoupled	   from	  what	  goes	  on	   in	  
the	   advanced	   world;	   that	   market	   discipline,	   transparency	   and	   microprudential	   regulation	   are	  
sufficient	   policy	   tools	   to	   ensure	   financial	   stability;	   that	   a	  monetary	   union	   can	   exist	   without	   fiscal	  
coordination;	   and	   that	   the	   IMF’s	   primary	   role	   should	   be	   that	   of	   monitoring	   over	   the	   Chinese	  
exchange	   rate	   policy.	   	   The	   crisis	   also	   opened	   to	   reexamination	   the	   principles	   that	   had	   guided	  
mainstream	  development	   economics	   over	   the	   past	   decades,	   from	   the	   role	   of	   governments	   in	   the	  
markets	  to	  the	  strategies	   for	  poverty	  reduction	  and	  business	  competitiveness	   (Canuto	  and	  Giugale	  
2010).	  
Does	   this	   mean	   that	   we	   are	   witnessing	   a	   paradigm	   change?	   	   It	   is	   probably	   too	   soon	   to	   tell.	  	  
Nevertheless,	   the	   ongoing	   contestation	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   reshape	   the	   contours	   of	   global	  
economic	   governance.	   	   However,	   the	   ultimate	   outcome	   of	   this	   battle	   will	   be	   decided	   by	   the	  
unstable,	  dynamic	  relationship	  that	  links	  together	  players,	  power	  and	  paradigms.	  
	  
III.	  Plan	  of	  the	  Book	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  handbook	  is	  to	  provide	  accessible	  and	  timely	  analyses	  of	  shifts	  in	  players,	  power	  
and	  paradigms	  within	  distinct	   issue	  areas	  and	   institutional	   arenas	  of	   global	   economic	   governance.	  	  
That	  is,	  we	  take	  a	  holistic	  approach	  to	  the	  study	  of	  global	  economic	  governance	  that	  aims	  to	  bring	  to	  
the	   surface	   the	   spill-­‐over	   effects	  within	   and	   between	   the	   three	   Ps.	   	   The	   Handbook	   thus	   seeks	   to	  
advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  interconnectedness	  that	  stands	  at	  the	  core	  of	  the	  architecture	  of	  
global	  economic	  governance.	  	  
We	  have	  organized	  the	  book	  around	  three	  major	  pillars	  of	  global	  economic	  activity:	   trade,	   finance	  
and	  money,	   and	   development.	   	   Each	   of	   these	   three	   sections	   is	   introduced	   by	   a	   contribution	   that	  
examines	   the	   main	   features	   of	   governance	   in	   the	   specific	   area	   of	   economic	   activity.	   	   Particular	  
attention	  is	  here	  devoted	  to	  the	  historical	  trajectory	  through	  which	  the	  governance	  of	  trade,	  finance	  
and	  development	  has	  been	  shaped	  over	  time.	  	  Rorden	  Wilkinson’s	  chapter	  (Chapter	  2),	  for	  instance,	  
sheds	  light	  on	  the	  institutional	  evolution	  that	  led	  to	  the	  WTO	  creation.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  challenges	  the	  
conventional	  view	  according	  to	  which	  the	  global	  trade	  regime	  is	  the	  result	  of	  tenacious	  international	  
efforts	   to	   pursue	   peace	   through	   the	   build-­‐up	   of	   solid	   and	  mutually	   beneficial	   trade	   relationships.	  	  
Rather,	  Wilkinson	  submits,	  the	  global	  trade	  regime	  reflects	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  global	  power	  relations	  
and	  its	  institutional	  design	  was	  mainly	  developed	  to	  pursue	  the	  national	  interests	  of	  its	  founding	  and	  
most	  dominant	  members.	  	  In	  introducing	  the	  finance	  and	  money	  section,	  Randall	  Germain	  (Chapter	  
7)	   explores	   the	   evolution	   of	   global	   financial	   governance	   by	   shedding	   light	   on	   the	   relationship	  
between	  private	   institutions	   and	   state	   agencies	   and	  between	  domestic	   and	   international	   levels	   of	  
authority.	   	  His	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  the	  roots	  of	  today’s	  financial	  governance	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	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the	  late	  19th	  century.	  	  Germain	  also	  emphasizes	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  global	  financial	  governance	  is	  
closely	   related	   to	   the	   evolution	   of	   financial	   institutions	   and	   their	   activities,	   together	   with	   the	  
development	   of	   relations	   among	   state-­‐led	   regulatory	   institutions	   such	   as	   central	   banks.	  	  
Furthermore,	  over	  the	  20th	  century,	  global	  financial	  governance	  has	  progressively	  encompassed	  an	  
international	  element	  made	  up	  of	  the	  relations	  among	  central	  banks	  and	  other	  regulatory	  agencies,	  
along	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  specialized	  international	  financial	  institutions.	  	  As	  for	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  
global	   development	   regime,	   David	   Williams	   illustrates	   and	   explains	   the	   main	   changes	   that	   have	  
taken	  place	  in	  the	  provision	  of	  aid	  to	  developing	  countries	  (Chapter	  16).	  	  Specifically,	  Williams	  draws	  
attention	  to	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  international	  development	  regime	  by	  shedding	  light	  on	  the	  role	  played	  
by	   the	   United	   States	   since	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   and	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	  
developmental	  paradigm.	  	  Aid	  was	  indeed	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  instrument	  in	  the	  foreign	  relations	  
of	   the	   United	   States	   in	   the	   context	   of	   its	   broader	   ambition	   to	   create	   a	   relatively	   open	   and	  
prosperous	  international	  economy	  and	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Cold	  War	  competition.	  	  These	  motivations	  
animated	   not	   only	   the	   US	   foreign	   aid	   activity	   but	   they	   also	   provided	   a	   key	   driver	   for	   the	  
institutionalization	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  development	  aid	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  
agencies.	  	  
These	   three	   chapters	   well	   capture	   some	   of	   the	   specificities	   of	   governance	   in	   trade,	   finance	   and	  
development	  respectively.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  these	  specificities,	  however,	  these	  introductory	  chapters	  share	  
a	   number	   of	   important	   insights	   that	   are	   crucial	   to	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   global	  
economic	  governance	  at	  large.	  	  Indeed,	  each	  of	  the	  three	  chapters	  points	  to	  the	  increasing	  plurality	  
of	  players	  that	   is	   involved	  in	  governance	  decisions.	   	  And	  even	  when	  states	  still	  play	  a	  predominant	  
role,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  Wilkinson’s	  and	  William’s	  chapters	  for	  instance,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  competing	  
actors	  including	  international	  institutions,	  NGOs	  and	  private	  actors	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  difficult	  
to	   ignore.	   	   Power	   asymmetries	   are	   another	   element	   that	   all	   authors	   emphasize	   in	   their	   chapters.	  	  
They	  can	  be	  conceived	  as	  ‘asymmetries	  of	  opportunities’	  (gains	  are	  not	  equal	  for	  all	  participants	  as	  
Wilikinson	   suggests)	   or	   as	   an	   uneven	  distribution	   of	   power	   resources	   (as	   is	   the	   case	   in	  Germain’s	  
account).	   	   Another	   cross-­‐cutting	   theme	   regards	   the	   path-­‐dependent	   evolution	   of	   global	   economic	  
governance	   in	   that	   previous	   institutional	   developments	   always	   affect	   later	   ones.	   	   For	   instance,	  
discussing	   the	   19th	   century	  GFG,	   based	   around	  hauté	   finance,	  Germain	   notes	   that	   ‘while	   there	   is	  
scholarly	  debate	  about	  the	  efficacy	  of	   this	  essentially	  private	   form	  of	  governance,	   there	  can	  be	  no	  
doubt	  that	  it	  formed	  the	  essential	  bedrock	  upon	  which	  later	  attempts	  to	  extend	  and	  entrench	  global	  
governance	   were	   built’.	   	   The	   transformations	   of	   paradigms	   and	   crisis	   narratives	   are	   key	   to	   the	  
developments	   in	   global	   economic	   governance.	   	   Crisis	   and	   change	   are	   indeed	   intertwined	   in	   the	  
evolution	   of	   global	   economic	   governance.	   	   And	   a	   crisis	   narrative	   can	   even	   be	   considered	   as	  
necessary	  condition	  to	  create	  ‘momentum’	  behind	  the	  evolution	  of	  global	  governance	  (Wilkinson	  in	  
this	  volume).	  
The	  general	  trends	  in	  GEG	  identified	  by	  Wilkinson,	  Germain	  and	  Williams	  are	  then	  further	  expanded	  
and	  specified	  in	  the	  single	  empirical	  chapters	  that	  make	  up	  this	  handbook.	   	  Each	  chapter	   is	   indeed	  
designed	   to	   provide	   an	   overview	   of	   the	   major	   principles,	   rules,	   norms	   and	   formal	   and	   informal	  
institutions	   that	   have	   governed	   international	   economic	   activity	   within	   the	   issue	   areas	   of	   trade,	  
finance	   and	  money,	   and	   development.	   	   In	   their	   examination,	   the	   contributing	   authors	   tackle	   the	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driving	   questions	   regarding	   patterns	   of	   continuity	   and	   change	   in	   the	   key	   players,	   power	   and	  
paradigms	  and	  how	  they	  are	  related	  to	  crises	  of	  legitimacy,	  relevance	  and	  effectiveness.	  
In	   Chapter	   3,	   Robert	   Wolfe	   investigates	   an	   important	   dimension	   of	   the	   WTO	   work,	   namely	   the	  
promotion	  of	  transparency	  in	  trade	  policy.	  	  Providing	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  transparency	  
has	   developed	   over	   time,	   the	   author	   highlights	   the	   efficiency	   challenges	   that	   this	   development	  
entails.	  	  Indeed,	  transparency	  can	  be	  conceived	  as	  a	  double-­‐edge	  sword:	  it	  can	  act	  as	  a	  ‘disinfectant’	  
but	   it	  may	   also	   undermine	   the	   privacy	   that	   is	   essential	   to	   negotiations	   and	   hinder	   the	   process	   of	  
liberalization.	  
In	   Chapter	   4,	   Eugenia	   da	   Conceição-­‐Heldt	   examines	   one	   of	   the	   key	   players	   in	   the	   global	   trade	  
regime,	  namely	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  impact	  of	  EU	  preferences	  and	  behaviour	  on	  the	  
global	   trade	   regime.	   	   Focusing	   on	   the	   EU’s	   strategy	   to	   rely	   on	   regionalism	   and	   bilateralism,	   she	  
highlights	  the	  risk	  of	  fragmentation	  in	  the	  global	  trade	  regime	  deriving	  from	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  WTO	  
principle	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  or	  reciprocity.	  
Chapter	  5	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  exploration	  of	  the	  governance	  of	  intellectual	  property.	  	  Here,	  Susan	  Sell	  
captures	   the	   key	   features	   and	   challenges	   of	   the	   governance	   of	   this	   important	   area	   of	   economic	  
activity.	   	   These	   features	   include	   the	   proliferation	   of	   forum,	   forum	   shopping	   and	   the	   increasing	  
relevance	   of	   non-­‐state	   actors,	   from	   private	   sector	   rights	   holders	   to	   public	   health	   advocates	   and	  
crusaders	  for	  Internet	  freedom.	  	  This	  peculiar	  configuration	  of	  governance	  risks	  creating	  overlapping	  
mandates	   across	   the	   institutions	   involved	   and	   creates	   disparities	   of	   access	   opportunities	   for	   the	  
several	  players	  involved.	  
In	   Chapter	   6,	   Kim	   Burnett	   and	   Jennifer	   Clapp	   evaluate	   the	   emergence	   and	   evolution	   of	   the	  
governance	  of	  trade	  in	  global	  food	  and	  agriculture.	   	   In	  doing	  so,	  they	  bring	  to	  the	  surface	  a	  crucial	  
shift	  in	  the	  key	  players,	  their	  sources	  of	  power,	  and	  perspectives	  on	  agricultural	  trade.	  	  In	  particular,	  
they	  highlight	  a	   shift	   from	  agricultural	   trade	  dominated	  by	   state	  actors	   to	  a	   system	  where	  private	  
actors	  have	  taken	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  shaping	  the	  rules	  and	  practices	  that	  govern	  the	  system.	  	  Private	  
actors	  here	  refer	  to	   large-­‐scale	  agricultural	  commodity	  trading	  firms	  and	  supermarket	  chains.	   	  This	  
shift	  raises	  serious	  challenges	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  current	  agricultural	  trade	  regime,	  as	  attested	  
by	   the	   movements	   that	   have	   emerged	   to	   resist	   the	   regime,	   such	   as	   the	   fair	   trade	   and	   food	  
sovereignty	  movements.	  	  
Moving	  from	  trade	  to	  money	  and	  financial	  governance,	  Chapter	  8	  examines	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  G20	  
Leaders.	   	   Specifically,	   Lora	  Viola	   investigates	   the	  motivations	   that	   led	   to	   the	  creation	  of	   this	  body,	  
the	   institutional	  design	  and	  governance	   functions	  of	   the	  G20.	   	   In	  doing	  so,	   she	   identifies	   the	  main	  
effectiveness	   and	   legitimacy	   challenges	   that	   the	   G20	   is	   likely	   to	   confront.	   	   In	   particular,	   she	  
emphasizes	  how	   the	  very	  exclusivity	  and	   informality	   that	   characterize	   the	  G20	  create	  problems	  of	  
legitimacy	  and	  authority.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  Viola	  highlights	  the	  advancements	  in	  GEG	  that	  
the	  creation	  of	  the	  G20	  has	  achieved.	   	  First,	   its	  membership	  reflects	  a	  growing	  realization	  that	  the	  
balance	   of	   power	   among	   the	   central	   players	   in	   the	   global	   economy	   has	   shifted,	   and	   that	   existing	  
institutions	   insufficiently	  reflect	  this	  shift.	   	  Second,	  she	  submits	  that	  the	  G20	  institutional	  flexibility	  
and	  its	  networked	  interaction	  with	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  reflect	  a	  leaner,	  more	  rapid	  
reaction	  force	  than	  the	  cumbersome	  and	  entrenched	  IGOs	  of	  the	  post-­‐WWII	  period.	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In	  Chapter	  9,	  Heather	  McKeen-­‐Edwards	  and	  Tony	  Porter	  shed	   light	  on	  the	  complex	  and	  variegated	  
relationship	  between	  private	  and	  public	  governance.	  	  In	  particular,	  they	  provide	  a	  survey	  of	  private	  
governance	   mechanisms	   in	   global	   finance	   drawing	   attention	   to	   the	   governance	   roles	   played	   by	  
business	   practices	   and	   infrastructures.	   	   These	   roles	   go	   beyond	   lobbying	   to	   include	  more	   complex	  
collaboration	  with	   public	   authorities	   in	   the	  making	   of	   rules,	   the	   creation	   of	   sets	   of	   standards	   for	  
industry,	  the	  ability	  to	  modify	  the	  conduct	  of	  firms	  and	  through	  educational	  programs	  and	  creating	  
objects	  that	  are	  crucial	  to	  market	   interactions,	  such	  as	  model	  contracts	  or	  the	  coding	  of	  electronic	  
systems.	   	   Assessing	   the	   different	   roles	   that	   private	   actors	   perform	   in	   global	   financial	   governance,	  
McKeen-­‐Edwards	  and	  Porter	  also	  find	  that,	  although	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  that	  began	  in	  2007	  did	  
serious	   damage	   to	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   private	   governance,	   private	   governance	   ultimately	   retains	   a	  
surprising	  degree	  of	  legitimacy.	  	  
In	   Chapter	   10,	   Stefano	   Pagliari	   examines	   one	   of	   the	   newest	   governance	   bodies	   in	   global	   financial	  
governance,	  namely	  the	  Financial	  Stability	  Board.	  	  In	  particular,	  he	  provides	  a	  historical	  overview	  of	  
the	  FSB	  and	  examines	   the	   tasks	   it	  performs.	   	   In	  doing	   that,	  he	   shows	   that	   the	   role	  of	   the	  FSB	  has	  
evolved	   from	   being	   primarily	   a	   coordination	  mechanism	   to	   an	   institution	   capable	   of	   exercising	   a	  
greater	  independent	  impact	  over	  global	  economic	  governance.	  	  Similar	  to	  what	  Viola	  argues	  for	  the	  
G20	  Leaders,	  Pagliari	  notes	  that	  the	  expansion	  in	  the	  membership	  of	  the	  FSB	  and	  the	  incorporation	  
of	   the	   main	   emerging	   countries	   has	   not	   fully	   addressed	   the	   legitimacy	   problems	   of	   this	   body.	  	  
Furthermore,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  yet	  how	  the	  FSB	  will	  be	  able	  to	  reconcile	  the	  expanded	  membership	  with	  
the	  consensus-­‐based	  decision-­‐making	  process	  that	  governs	  the	  institution.	  	  
Chapter	  11	   focuses	  on	  one	  of	   the	  most	   long-­‐standing	   institutions	   in	  global	   financial	  and	  monetary	  
governance,	  namely	  the	  IMF.	  	  Here	  Steve	  Nelson	  concentrates	  on	  the	  changing	  role	  of	  IMF	  lending,	  
also	  providing	  interesting	  insights	  into	  the	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  global	  
financial	   crisis.	   	   Examining	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   Fund’s	   financial	   assistance,	   the	   author	   draws	  
attention	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  economic	  ideas	  on	  how	  to	  balance	  the	  current	  account	  and	  the	  lack	  
of	   theoretical	   alternatives	   to	   the	   focus	   on	   public	   spending	   as	   a	  way	   to	   address	   external	   payment	  
problems.	   	   And,	   although	   the	   record	   of	   its	   lending	   programs	   has	   been	   checkered	   at	   best,	   Nelson	  
argues	  that	  this	   is	  not	  evidence	  of	  a	  legitimacy	  crisis.	   	  From	  his	  perspective,	  the	  IMF	  has	  been,	  and	  
will	  remain,	  essentially	  the	  only	  game	  in	  town	  when	  global	  financial	  markets	  enter	  a	  state	  of	  turmoil.	  
In	   Chapter	   12,	   Kevin	  Gallagher	   traces	   the	   history	   of	   governing	   global	   capital	   flows	   and	  presents	   a	  
framework	   for	   understanding	   three	   distinct	   eras	   in	   the	  modern	   governance	   of	   global	   capital.	   	   His	  
framework	   emphasizes	   how	   power,	   interests,	   ideas,	   and	   institutions	   interacted	   (and	   continue	  
interacting)	  to	  shape	  each	  era	  in	  different	  combinations	  to	  yield	  different	  outcomes.	  	  Gallagher	  also	  
concentrates	  on	  current	  developments	  suggesting	  that	  what	  has	  emerged	  since	  the	  global	  financial	  
crisis	   is	   an	   incoherent	  mix	   of	   cooperative	  decentralization	   and	   strong	   international	   standards	   that	  
may	  threaten	  the	  ability	  of	  nations	  to	  govern	  global	  capital	  effectively.	  	  	  
In	  Chapter	  13,	  Ronen	  Palan	  and	  Anastasia	  Nesvetailova	  offer	  an	  examination	  of	   the	  major	  players	  
shaping	   the	   regulatory	   debate	   on	   offshore	   and	   shadow	   banking,	   including	   the	   core	   industrialised	  
countries	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  China.	  	  Next	  to	  these	  state	  actors,	  however,	  a	  plurality	  of	  other	  non-­‐
state	  actors	  is	  also	  key	  to	  the	  development	  of	  regulation	  of	  this	  important	  area	  of	  economic	  activity.	  	  
These	  include	  both	  private	  stakeholders,	  such	  as	  banks,	  hedge	  funds,	  and	  international	  professional	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services	   companies,	   and	   civil	   society	   organisations,	   such	   as	   the	   Tax	   Justice	   Network	   or	   Finance	  
Watch.	  	  Palan	  and	  Nesvetailova	  also	  note	  that	  the	  political	  confrontation	  among	  these	  key	  actors	  is	  
taking	  place	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  clearly	  defined	  paradigm	  of	  regulation	  and	  governance.	  	  
Chapter	  14	  is	  devoted	  to	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  Eurozone	  debt	  crisis	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  GEG.	  	  In	  
particular,	  Matthias	  Matthjis	  explores	  the	  main	  factors	  that	  contributed	  to	  the	  crisis.	  	  These	  include	  
the	  diverging	  interests	  among	  the	  various	  players	  (including	  the	  EMU	  member	  states,	  the	  IMF,	  and	  
the	  main	  EU	  institutions),	  the	  relative	  effectiveness	  or	  power	  of	  Europe’s	  supra-­‐national	  institutions	  
and	   the	   battle	   of	   economic	   paradigms	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   crisis	   in	   trying	   to	   determine	   how	   the	  
Eurozone	  should	  be	  governed	  in	  the	  future.	  	  After	  looking	  at	  the	  medium-­‐term	  prospects	  of	  Europe’s	  
single	   currency,	   the	   chapter	   also	   engages	   with	   the	   implications	   of	   the	   euro	   crisis	   for	   the	   global	  
governance	  of	  finance	  and	  money	  in	  today’s	  world	  economy.	  
In	  Chapter	  15	  Mihn	  Ly	  reflects	  on	  the	  dollar’s	  status	  as	  the	  leading	  international	  reserve	  currency.	  In	  
particular,	   he	   engages	   with	   the	   question	   of	   what	   the	   future	   holds	   for	   the	   dollar	   as	   compared	   to	  
alternative	   reserve	  currencies.	   	  Adopting	  an	   institutionalist	   approach,	  which	  complements	  market,	  
instrumental,	   and	   geopolitical	   perspectives	   on	   reserve	   currency	   status,	   the	   author	   suggests	   that	  
neither	  the	  IMF	  nor	  the	  ECB	  currently	  have	  the	  institutional	  powers	  that	  the	  Fed	  has	  to	  support	  SDRs	  
or	  the	  euro	  to	  sufficiently	  challenge	  the	  dollar.	  
As	  anticipated,	  the	  last	  substantive	  section	  of	  the	  Handbook	  is	  dedicated	  to	  development.	  	  Hence,	  a	  
chapter	  dedicated	  to	  the	  development	  institution	  par	  excellence	  opens	  up	  this	  section.	   	   In	  Chapter	  
17,	   Matthew	   Winters	   and	   Shyam	   Kulkarni	   focus	   on	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   its	   role	   as	   a	   lender	   of	  
international	   development	   funds.	   	   Focusing	   on	   the	   ‘governance	   and	   anticorruption’	   agenda,	   they	  
show	  how	  this	  agenda	  emerged	  as	  the	  product	  of	  crises	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  effectiveness	  linked	  to	  the	  
failures	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  lending	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s.	   	  They	  also	  highlight	  the	  
continued	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   GAC	   agenda.	   	   In	   their	   view,	   these	   weaknesses	   derive	   from	   the	  
challenges	   of	   creating	   better	   governing	   institutions	   in	   the	   developing	   world;	   the	   disbursement	  
culture	  that	  drives	  bureaucratic	  decisions	  within	  the	  Bank;	  and	  the	  unanswered	  question	  of	  to	  which	  
constituencies	  the	  Bank	  should	  be	  responsive.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  18	  Stephen	  Browne	  reviews	  the	  challenges	   facing	  the	  UN	  development	  system	  (UNDS).	  	  
In	   particular,	   he	  draws	   attention	   to	   the	   increasing	   fragmentation	  of	   the	   system	   (which,	   in	   turn,	   is	  
closely	  related	  to	  its	  historical	  evolution),	  duplication	  of	  effort,	  and	  unhealthy	  competition.	  	  Browne	  
also	  notes	  that	  the	  system	  remains	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  traditional	  developed	  country	  donors	  and	  
their	   contributions.	   	   In	   spite	  of	   these	   shortcomings,	   the	  author	   suggests	   that	   change	   is	  unlikely	   to	  
come	  soon,	  if	  at	  all.	   	  He	  argues	  that	  there	  is	   little	  motivation	  either	  from	  within	  or	  from	  outside	  to	  
reform	   a	   system	   that,	   while	   not	   very	   effective	   in	   terms	   of	   development	   support,	   enjoys	   a	  
comfortable	  relationship	  with	  the	  member	  states.	  	  
Chapter	   19	   is	   dedicated	   to	   the	   examination	   of	   regional	   development	   banks	   (RDBs)	   in	   global	  
economic	   governance.	   	   Here	   Jonathan	   Strand	   describes	   both	   the	   historical	   contexts	   of	   the	  major	  
RDBs	  and	  their	  internal	  governance.	  	  The	  author	  devotes	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  investigation	  of	  
the	   role	   that	  bureaucracies	  and	   ideational	  aspects	  play	   in	   the	  RDBs	   lending	  practices.	   	   Strand	  also	  
sheds	   light	   on	   the	   response	   of	   the	  RDBs	   to	   the	   2007–2008	   financial	   crisis,	   arguing	   that	   the	  RDBs’	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crisis	   reaction	   reflects	   the	   close	   ties	   between	   these	   banks	   and	   other	   leading	   development	  
institutions	  and	  ideas.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  20,	  Michael	  Findley	  and	  Katherine	  Kitterman	  expand	  the	  research	  agenda	  of	  development	  
by	  devoting	  attention	  to	  new	  players	   in	   the	  provision	  of	  aid.	   	   In	  particular,	   they	   focus	  on	  the	  non-­‐
DAC	   donors—that	   is	   to	   say,	   donors	   that	   do	   not	   belong	   to	   the	   OECD’s	   Development	   Assistance	  
Committee	   (DAC).	   	   Considering	   differences	   between	   DAC	   and	   non-­‐DAC	   donors	   over	   time	   (1973–
2009),	   by	   region	   of	   recipient,	   and	   by	   aid	   sector,	   the	   authors	   highlight	   how	   non-­‐DAC	   donors	   have	  
grown	   in	   influence	  and	  have	  begun	  to	  pose	  a	  potential	  challenge	  to	  the	  traditional	  DAC	  approach.	  	  
Indeed,	   these	   new	   donors	   offer	   alternative	   development	   models	   and	  may	   introduce	   competitive	  
pressures	  into	  the	  aid	  market.	  	  
In	  Chapter	  21,	  Tim	  Büthe	  and	  Cindy	  Cheng	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  private	  actors	   in	  raising,	  allocating,	  
and	  implementing	  international	  development	  aid.	  	  With	  particular	  attention	  paid	  to	  transnational	  aid	  
NGOs,	  the	  authors	  examine	  the	  sources	  of	  their	  power	  and	  influence	  and	  examine	  how	  ideas	  about	  
development	  and	  aid	  have	  shaped	  the	  rise	  of	  these	  new	  players.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  identify	  the	  main	  
challenges	   that	   the	   activities	   of	   these	   players	   entail.	   	   In	   particular,	   they	   identify	   serious	  
accountability	   challenges	   in	   that	   donors’	   and	   local	   beneficiaries’	   ability	   to	   hold	   service	   providers	  
accountable	  is	  limited.	  
Collectively,	   these	   chapters	   indicate	   that	  we	   are	   living	   an	   era	   of	   changes	   and	   tensions	  within	   the	  
existing	   structures	   of	   global	   economic	   governance.	   	   First,	   the	   range	   of	   players	   involved	   in	  
governance	  decisions	  has	  kept	  increasing	  over	  time,	  including	  both	  states	  and	  a	  huge	  variety	  of	  non-­‐
state	   actors.	   	   And	   even	   among	   states,	   the	   identity	   of	   relevant	   players	   is	   changing	   with	   the	  
progressive	   rise	   of	   emerging	  market	   countries.	   	   Second,	   the	   sources	   of	   power	   have	   expanded	   to	  
include	   both	   material	   and	   institutional	   resources,	   such	   as	   channels	   of	   access	   to	   decision-­‐making	  
processes.	  	  The	  fragmentation	  of	  governance	  in	  several	  areas	  of	  economic	  activity	  analysed	  here	  also	  
reveals	   that	   some	   players	   are	   more	   powerful	   than	   others	   because	   they	   are	   able	   to	   exploit	   such	  
institutional	   fragmentation.	   	   Finally,	   economic	  paradigms	  are	  evolving,	   but,	   interestingly,	   the	  pace	  
and	  direction	  of	  their	  change	  is	  limited	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  legacies	  of	  past	  ideas	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  
governance	  mechanisms	   that	   are	   in	   place.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   rather	   than	   dramatic	   changes	   in	   how	   the	  
global	  economy	  is	  governed,	  a	  common	  pattern	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  emerging	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  is	  a	  
process	  of	  progressive	  adaptation	  and	  adjustments	  at	  the	  margins.	  	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  
the	  case	  studies	  indicate	  that	  today’s	  GEG	  is	  torn	  between	  opposing	  trends.	  	  For	  instance,	  if	  on	  the	  
one	   the	   one	   hand	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2007–08	   has	   reaffirmed	   the	   importance	   of	   IMF	  
lending,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   this	   process	   is	   undermined	   by	   the	   concomitant	   rise	   of	   financial	  
regionalism	  both	   in	  Asia	  and	  Europe.	   	  Likewise,	   there	   is	  a	  growing	  tension	  between	  the	  regime	  on	  
capital	  controls	  embodied	  by	  the	  IMF	  (which	  allows	  for	  the	  use	  of	  controls	  at	  least	  in	  principle)	  and	  
the	   regime	   on	   controls	   under	   regional	   or	   bilateral	   investment	   treaties	   (that	   rule	   out	   the	   use	   of	  
controls).	  
In	   order	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   all	   these	   emerging	   trends,	   the	   last	   chapter	   of	   this	   volume	   takes	   up	   a	  
systemic	  perspective	  by	  examining	  the	  shifts	  in	  power,	  players	  and	  paradigms	  since	  2008	  in	  an	  effort	  
to	   develop	   expectations	   for	   the	   future	   of	   global	   economic	   governance.	   	   Daniel	   Drezner	   thus	  
identifies	  competing	  forces	  at	  play.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  he	  notes	  that	  the	  number	  of	  actors	  possessing	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‘deterrent	  power’	  has	   increased.	   	  This	   increases	  uncertainty	  about	  power	  and	  preferences,	  making	  
policy	   coordination	   unquestionably	   harder.	   	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   however,	   there	   is	   an	   incredible	  
resilience	   in	   the	  paradigm	   that	   animates	   the	   international	   economic	  order.	   	  As	  Drezner	  notes,	   ‘At	  
both	  the	  elite	  and	  mass	  levels,	  the	  demand	  for	  substantive	  alterations	  to	  the	  neoclassical	  economic	  
paradigm	  has	  been	  relatively	  muted.’	   	  As	  a	  result,	  since	  the	  start	  of	  the	  crisis,	  no	  alternative	  policy	  
paradigm	  has	  emerged	  and	   the	  policy	   changes	  adopted	   thus	   far	  have	  been	  minor	   tinkering	   to	   the	  
governance	  of	   the	  global	   economic	  order	   and	  have	  even	   reinforced	   the	   status	  quo.	   	  Drezner	   thus	  
submits	   that,	   although	   the	   sources	   of	   disagreement	   have	   increased	   paralleling	   the	   rise	   of	   new	  
players,	  disagreements	  about	  the	  social	  purpose	  of	  the	  global	  economic	  order	  has	  not.	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